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ULTRAHAZARDOUS PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: PROVIDING VICTIMS OF
WELL-MADE FIREARMS AMMUNITION TO
FIRE BACK AT GUN MANUFACTURERS
John P. McNicholas* and Matthew McNicholas**
I. INTRODUcTION
A. The Petit & Martin Massacre of 1993 Illustrates That the Sole
Purpose of Assault Weapons is to Kill as Many People as Possible
in the Shortest Amount of Time
On July 1, 1993, seven innocent people were brutally mur-
dered and six others injured when Gian Ferri walked into the con-
ference room of Petit & Martin, a now-defunct San Francisco law
firm, and opened fire with two TEC-DC9 semiautomatic military
assault pistols (TEC-DC9).1 Both of Ferri's guns were equipped
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International Academy of Trial Lawyers; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers and
Diplomate, American Board of Trial Advocates; Past President, American Board of Trial
Advocates, Los Angeles.
** Law Clerk to United States District Court Judge William J. Rea, Central District of
California; B.A., with honors, 1994, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D., 1997,
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
This Article is dedicated to DeDe McNicholas, wife of John and mother of Mat-
thew, whose love and support made possible our legal careers, which have given birth to
this work. We would also like to thank Professor Daniel P. Selmi of Loyola of Los Angeles
Law School for reviewing drafts of this Article and for his invaluable insight and com-
ments.
1. See First Amended Complaint for Damages for Wrongful Death, Negligence, Strict
Liability, Punitive Damages (Survival) and Unfair Business Practices at 1, Sposato v.
Navegar, Inc., No. 960937 (Super. Ct. S.F. County, June 22, 1994) [hereinafter
"Complaint"]. This is Stephen and Meghan Sposato's first amended complaint against the
manufacturers of the TEC-DC9, the high-capacity bullet magazines, and the Hell-Fire trig-
ger system enhancement as well as the pawn shop that sold one of the guns to Ferri. This is
the only complaint referred to throughout this Article. As there were seven bystanders
killed and six others injured, several different complaints have been filed. However, this
Article refers only to the Sposato's complaint.
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with Hell-Fire trigger systems and high-capacity ammunition
magazines, allowing each weapon to discharge thirty-two rounds of
ammunition at a fully automatic rate.2 After cutting down his vic-
tims with a hail of bullets, Ferri turned his weapons on himself and
took his own life, bringing the death toll to eight .
After that moment, the lives of the victims, their families, and
their loved ones were changed forever, while the lives of the
manufacturers of the TEC-DC9, 4 the Hell-Fire trigger system,5 and
the high-capacity ammunition magazines' used in the massacre
continue as if nothing happened. Undaunted and immune from
civil tort liability, these entities continue to sell their products to
the general consumer public without pause.
To understand the gravity of the situation requires a brief de-
scription of the awesome TEC-DC9s and their product enhance-
ments as used in the Petit & Martin shooting. The TEC-DC9 be-
fore modification is a semiautomatic assault weapon based on the
TEC-9, a product by the same manufacturer made for the South
African military7 and now banned in California.8 Since the TEC-9
was designed specifically for military use, the TEC-DC9 incorpo-
rates characteristics commonly found on military-style weapons
which enhance its user's ability to engage in extremely rapid and
sustained fire.9 For example, the barrels of Ferri's weapons were
threaded to accept silencers, and barrel shrouds protected his
hands from the extreme heat created during the rapid discharge.10
In addition, the product's swing swivel and shoulder strap en-
hanced Ferri's ability to spray fire from the hip." The TEC-DC9's
product manual describes the assault weapon as "'a radically new
type of semiautomatic pistol, designed to deliver a high volume of
2. See id. at 4.
3. See id at 1.
4. The TEC-DC9 is manufactured by Navegar, Inc. See id.
5. The Hell-Fire trigger system is manufactured by Orpheus Industries, Inc., doing
business as Hell-Fire Systems, Inc. See id.
6. The ammunition magazines used in the shooting were manufactured by U.S.A.
Magazines, Inc. See id.
7. See id. at 5.
8. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (West 1992) (stating that the sale,
manufacture, or possession of the TEC-9, among other assault weapons, "'poses a threat to
the health, safety, and security of all citizens' of California). This Article will discuss this
Penal Code section in greater detail.
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firepower."" 2
Beyond these standard features, Ferri's TEC-DC9s were
equipped with detachable ammunition magazines, each carrying
thirty-two rounds that could be fired without reloading.13 Further,
each trigger assembly was modified with the Hell-Fire trigger sys-
tem, allowing Ferri to dramatically accelerate his rate of 
fire.14
Hell-Fire's advertisements claim that a Hell-Fire trigger enhance-
ment enables a user to "'empt[y] complete magazines at a full
automatic rate."'
15
These products, either individually or when assembled as a
whole, are designed for the sole purpose of killing as many people
as possible in the shortest possible time. There is no other reason
to allow the gun to swivel from the hip in a spray-fire fashion, to
use detachable bullet magazines that permit the user to fire thirty-
two rounds without reloading, or to adjust the trigger so that the
product can empty its hail of fire at a fully automatic rate. Despite
this lethal design, however, the product manufacturers are exoner-
ated from legal responsibility. The makers of the TEC-DC9 and
its product enhancements, as well as the many other firearm manu-
facturers that sell their products to the general public in California,
are currently beyond the reach of tort liability, free to produce
their products in a legal vacuum.
B. The Victims of the Petit & Martin Shooting Fire Back with
Lawsuits and Survive Demurrer
1. The victims file lawsuits on theories of negligence and strict
liability against the multiple product manufacturers and the
product retailer
16
On June 22, 1994, the victims of the Petit & Martin massacre
fired back with a lawsuit against the manufacturers of the TEC-
DC9, the Hell-Fire trigger system, and the high-capacity maga-
zines, as well as AAL-JAYS Super Pawn, the pawn shop that sold
one of the two TEC-DC9s to Ferri. The complaint' s alleges sev-
12. Id.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See id. at 6. The Hell-Fire trigger system accelerates the rate of fire by returning a
firearm's trigger to the ready-to-fire position more quickly than would otherwise be the
case. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 8-33.
17. See id. at 1-8.
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enteen different causes of action based on several legal theories,"9
including negligence and strict liability.2° Under the negligence
theories plaintiffs allege that the product manufacturers knew
their goods were military-style weapons that had no sporting or
self-defense purposes and that it was reasonably foreseeable that
such products would be used in violent criminal acts if made avail-
able to the general public.21 Under the strict liability theories
plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers engaged in abnormally
dangerous activities by manufacturing and selling their products to
the general public in California, a state that banned the very simi-
lar TEC-9 firearm produced by the same manufacturer. 2
2. Plaintiffs survive demurrer
On April 10, 1995, the trial court issued its Opinion And Or-
der Re Demurrers, sustaining certain defendants' demurrers, in
part, and overruling certain defendants' demurrers, in part.z' In
that Order 4 the court made the following rulings: (1) Navegar,
Inc.'s demurrer, the manufacturer of the TEC-DC9, was denied as
to those causes of action based on abnormally dangerous activities
and negligent entrustment; (2) U.S.A. Magazine, Inc.'s demurrer,
18. The court and the pleadings now refer to the case as In re 101 California Street.
19. See Complaint at 8-33, Navegar (No. 960937).
20. See id. The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages, alleging that the manufacturers
sold their products to the general public knowing, or with conscious disregard of, the fact
that they had no legitimate sporting or self-defense purposes and would be used by crimi-
nals and others in military-style mass killings. This, plaintiffs allege, amounted to outra-
geous conduct. See id. at 8-36. This Article does not discuss the punitive damages aspect
of the case.
21. This is a "negligent entrustment theory." See WiLLLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 35 (4th ed. 1971).
22. See Complaint at 3-5, 10, Navegar (No. 960937).
23. In re 101 Cal. St., No. 959316 (Super. Ct. S.F. County Apr. 10, 1995) (opinion and
order sustaining certain defendants' demurrers in part and overruling others in part).
24. Because several plaintiffs filed separate complaints against several defendants, sev-
eral demurrers also were filed. This discussion is based on the court's Opinion And Order
Re Demurrers, filed April 10, 1995, which addressed all of the demurrers filed by U.S.A.
Magazines, Inc., and Navegar, Inc. Id. at 2. The manufacturer of the Hell-Fire trigger sys-
tem is not addressed because it filed bankruptcy and is no longer part of the case.
Note also that since this order was directed at the several demurrers filed by the
various defendants, it addresses all of the claims that stood as of the filing of the court's or-
der. Specifically, the order states that "[a]t this time, the Court has before it demurrers by
Navegar [the manufacturer of the TEC-DC9] and USA [the manufacturer of the ammunition
magazine used in the shooting] ... based on (1) Strict Liability, (2) Negligence Per Se, and
(3) Common Law Negligence." Id. Consequently, since the court addressed all of the legal
theories pending against these defendants and defined the status of the several plaintiffs'
cases with this one order, this Article will use the order to define the current "status" of the
lawsuit as of the time of this Article's publication.
June 1997] ULTRAHAZARDOUS PRODUCTS LIABILITY
the manufacturer of the high volume detachable ammunition
magazines, was sustained as to the plaintiffs' claims based on ul-
trahazardous activities; and (3) Navegar, Inc.'s demurrer regarding
the claim based on negligent entrustment was sustained with leave
to amend. It is the court's decisions regarding Navegar, Inc., the
manufacturer of the TEC-DC9, that are discussed more thor-
oughly throughout this Article.
C. Article Outline
This Article uses 101 California Street to examine current
theories of products liability as applied to manufacturers of "well-
made" guns,2 to exemplify the shortcomings of those theories in
well-made gun cases, and to set the stage for the creation of a new
cause of action. This Article begins by summarizing the current
status of tort law with respect to product manufacturers in general,
focusing on the three legal theories of negligence, strict products
liability, and ultrahazardous activities. This Article analyzes each
theory under a well-made gun plaintiff scenario, such as that de-
scribed above, illustrating current tort law's shortcomings in the
area. From these shortcomings, this Article advocates the creation
of a new theory of recovery, extrapolated from the current theo-
ries of ultrahazardous activities and design defect under strict
products liability. The new theory is called Ultrahazardous Prod-
ucts Liability ("UPL") and would hold the manufacturers? of cer-
tain well-made firearms27 liable for all damages caused by their
products.2u These manufacturers would be removed from their le-
25. A "well-made" gun, or firearm, refers to a gun or firearm that operates and per-
forms exactly as designed and manufactured. In other words, it discharges its ammunition
as any ordinary person would expect. See Gerald M. Mackarevich, Note, Manufacturers'
Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 467, 468
(1983).
26. The reference to manufacturers is a shorthand reference to all the parties in the
chain of distribution normally held liable under strict products liability.
27. The scope of firearms included will be discussed later in this Article.
28. This Article does not address claims involving guns that have malfunctioned in
their operation because such claims are covered under existing tort theories. See Johnson v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding the manufacturer of a
revolver liable under theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty because
the gun's design allowed it to discharge even with the hammer in the safety position); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Davis, 234 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1970) (sustaining jury verdict against manu-
facturer of .22 caliber rifle where plaintiff suffered injuries when the rifle fired with the
safety on); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397 (111. 1990) (holding manufacturer
of Remington Model 1100 12-gauge shotgun liable to injured plaintiff under negligence
theory when barrel of shotgun exploded during trap shooting); Moore v. Remington Arms
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gal vacuum and treated the same as all other product manufactur-
ers who are held liable for the damages caused by their goods.
The basis for UPL is simple. Consumers and bystanders in-
jured by well-made gun products should be able to hold the manu-
facturers civilly liable for damages inflicted by such products.
Since current tort theories fail to provide such remedies, shrouding
the gun industry in a blanket of protection woven from legal tech-
nicalities, the law must evolve to meet the needs of the average
consumer and provide a basis for recovery. The result of this
evolution is the theory of UPL.
Underlying the paradigm that victims of well-made firearms
should be allowed to recover from firearm manufacturers is that,
as between the relevant parties involved in the production, distri-
bution, and sale of well-made firearms, the party most responsible
for the loss should have the duty of repair.2 ' As between the
manufacturer and the victim, the manufacturer is certainly more
culpable and clearly more blameworthy as the entity that designed,
marketed, and delivered the firearm into the general consumer
population.
The benefits of this new theory of recovery would be two-fold.
First, victims would have a previously untapped source of damage
recovery.30 Second, UPL would force the targeted manufacturers
to proactively engage in a more responsible course of behavior to
protect the general public from the hazards of their products.3'
This would be spurred by the economic incentive of avoiding large
civil damage awards that would result when manufacturers fail to
Co., 427 N.E.2d 608 (I1. App. Ct. 1981) (holding shotgun manufacturer strictly liable after
barrel of gun exploded on the theory that the type of metal used in the manufacture of the
gun was defective); Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding manufacturer liable for defective safety mechanism on shotgun when gun ex-
ploded and shooter lost his thumb).
29. See Ronald R. Ratton, Corrective Justice and the D.C. Assault Weapon Liability
Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 287, 305 (1993) (discussing the theory of corrective justice as applied to
the D.C. assault weapons strict liability act).
30. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 469.
Another factor to which courts have given weight in balancing the interests before
them is the relative ability of the respective parties to bear the loss which must
necessarily fall upon one or the other.... [It is a matter of their capacity to ab-
sorb the loss or avoid it.... Rather than leave the loss on the shoulders of the
individual plaintiff, who may be rined by it, the courts have tended to find rea-
sons to shift it to the defendants.
Id. (quoting WiLLLAM L. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THm LAW OF TOTs § 4 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted).
31. See id. at 469-70. For example, gun manufactures may have to implement a distri-
bution screening process or more carefully design their mass-marketing programs.
[Vol. 30:1557
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act responsibly. Put simply, weapon manufacturers would invest
extra capital in the design, sale, and distribution processes rather
than pay large verdicts after the fact. If they fail to do so, they
would bear the risk of loss.
With the theory of Ultrahazardous Products Liability, gun
manufacturers would no longer be able to flood the general con-
sumer market with products intentionally designed to kill and
maim without bearing financial responsibility when their design
goal is realized.
II. ANALYSIS OF A NEW THEORY OF RECOVERY IN TORT LAW:
ULTRAHAZARDOUS PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Existing Tort Law Allows Recovery Against Product
Manufacturers Under Theories of Negligence, Strict Products
Liability, and Ultrahazardous Activities but Fails to Provide a
Remedy for Well-Made Gun Plaintiffs
1. Negligence theories in a products liability case and their
availability to well-made gun plaintiffs
A products liability case can be approached under two negli-
gence theories. Under the first theory, the plaintiff alleges that the
product was negligently manufactured or designed.32 Under the
second theory, the plaintiff alleges that the product was negligently
entrusted or marketed. 33 In the context of well-made handguns,
however, the former theory fails by definition, and the latter has
been generally rejected under current law.34
Under the first negligence approach, a product manufacturer
has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design,35 manufac-
ture," and testing and inspection7 of the product and in the testing
32. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (5th
ed. 1984).
33. See id. The theory of negligent entrustment was plead by certain Petit & Martin
plaintiffs.
34. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 471.
35. See Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 258, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737, 743-44
(1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965).
36. See Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 412, 126 P.2d 345, 345-46 (1942); Nebe-
lung v. Norman, 14 Cal. 2d 647, 652, 96 P.2d 327, 329 (1939); Reynolds v. Natural Gas
Equip., Inc., 184 Cal. App. 2d 724, 737-38, 7 Cal. Rptr. 879, 886-87 (1960); Darling v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 720, 341 P.2d 23, 28 (1959); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
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and inspection of any component parts made by another38 so that
the product may safely be used in the manner and for the purpose
for which it was made. In the case of a well-made gun, the manu-
facturer is not negligent by definition because it has provided a
product that can be safely used in the manner and for the purpose
for which it was designed. That is what is meant by a "well-made
firearm." Thus, with respect to well-made gun plaintiffs, this the-
ory is inherently flawed and therefore unavailable to victims in
cases such as 101 California Street.
The second theory, negligent entrustment or marketing, does
not suffer from the same definitional flaw but nonetheless fails as a
viable means of recovery for well-made gun plaintiffs. To succeed
under such a claim, plaintiffs must allege and prove that they were
injured because the manufacturer supplied a product to a third
person with actual or constructive knowledge that such person
might use the object in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of
harm to the plaintiff and others.39 This theory is based on section
390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
One who supplies ... a chattel for the use of another
whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be
likely... to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk
of physical harm to... others whom the supplier should
expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject
to liability for physical harm resulting to them.4o
In the case of a well-made gun, the focus of negligent conduct
is on the method of distribution,41 requiring proof that the gun
manufacturer possessed actual or constructive knowledge that the
person ultimately acquiring the gun could not be trusted with it.
42
37. See Reynolds, 184 Cal. App. 2d at 738-39, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 888; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 396 (1965).
38. See Reynolds, 184 Cal. App. 2d at 738-39, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 888; E.L. Kellett, Anno-
tation, Product Liability: Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Component Supplied
byAnother and Incorporated in Product, 3 A.L.R.3d 1016 (1965).
39. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 472.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
41. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 471 (citing Stuart M. Speiser, Disarming the
Handgun Problem by Directly Suing Arms Makers, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1981, at 29).
42. See id. at 472 (citing Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965)
(holding that, despite knowledge of boy's use of gun, an adult who gave a gun to a fifteen-
year-old boy and the dealer who sold the gun to the adult were not negligent after the boy
shot a companion because neither knew of the boy's carelessness). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965) (stating that one who supplies chattel for the use of an-
other, whom the supplier knows or has reason to know will use the chattel in a manner in-
volving unreasonable risk, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting from that use).
[Vol. 30:1557
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Or, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts states, the plaintiff must
show that the manufacturer knew or had reason to know of the ac-
quiring party's incompetence.4 Under this legal standard, how-
ever, well-made gun plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in asserting
negligent entrustment claims for one of two reasons. Either they
have been unable to sustain their burden of proof,4 or courts have
simply refused to recognize the cause of action altogether.4
In 101 California Street, the court allowed the plaintiffs to pro-
ceed on their claim of negligent entrustment on a very narrow fac-
tual ground, evidencing the difficulty that such a claim presents a
well-made gun plaintiff. Specifically, the court relied on Navegar,
Inc.'s attempted circumvention of a certain assault weapons ban in
California in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the plain-
tiffs' negligence theory. In its Order of April 10, 1995, the court
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 390 (1965).
44. See id. Under this section, a plaintiff must prove that the supplier knew or had rea-
son to know of use in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm. See id.
45. See Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (stating that
Ohio does not recognize a defective distribution theory for handgun manufacturers); Patter-
son v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985) ("[t]here is simply no such prod-
ucts liability principle as 'defect in distribution'); Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62
Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976) (a minor injured by a slingshot sued the dis-
tributor and retailer under a negligent entrustment theory alleging that the distributor owed
a duty to refrain from distributing slingshots to a class of persons likely to misuse them; the
court disagreed because such a finding would amount to a constructive judicial ban on
slingshots); Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(dismissed plaintiffs' negligence theory against manufacturer of a shotgun used to kill eight
people because neither the manufacturer nor the distributor had a duty to prevent the sale of
handguns to persons who are likely to cause the public harm); Addison v. Williams, 546 So.
2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing cause of action against gun manufacturer alleging
negligent distribution because a manufacturer simply has no duty to refrain from placing
legal, non-defective products in the general market); see also Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656
F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987) (stating that handgun manufacturers are not subject to
duty of care "not to sell their products, merely because such products have the potential to
be misused for purposes of criminal activity"); Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,
477 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that handgun manufacturers and dis-
tributors owed no duty to plaintiffs to control the distribution of handguns); Linton v. Smith
& Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that manufacturer had no duty to
control or regulate distribution of nondefective firearm to general public); Earsing v. Nel-
son, 629 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that where infant plaintiff was injured by
shot from air gun purchased by thirteen-year-old boy, the theory of negligent entrustment
did not extend to the manufacturer of the air gun).
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275 (West 1992). This penal code section includes the
Roberti-Roos Assault Weapon Control Act ("AWCA"). See id. The AWCA is a gun-ban
statute which includes the TEC-9, predecessor to the TEC-DC9. Id. § 12276. This ban will
be discussed in more detail later in this Article. At this time, it is only relevant to know that
the court heavily relied on this ban to allow the plaintiffs to continue with the negligent en-
trustment claim.
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stated:
Plaintiffs do not claim [the manufacturer] breached its
duty merely because they marketed the TEC-DC9 in a
negligent manner.... [Rather, in 1989,] the California
Legislature "prospectively prohibit[ed] the sale" of the
TEC-9 [through the enactment of the Roberti-Roos As-
sault Weapons Control Act ("AWCA")]. Despite this
prohibition, plaintiffs allege, Navegar modified the [TEC-
9 into the TEC-DC9] in an attempt to avoid the ban and
then put [the TEC-DC9] into a stream of California
commerce. Ferri bought the modified weapon and killed
or injured sixteen people with it. This alleged conduct fits
California's law of negligence very well.47
With this language, the trial court greatly circumscribed the plain-
tiffs' negligent entrustment claim, allowing it to survive only on the
theory that Navegar, Inc., the gun manufacturer, attempted to cir-
cumvent the California gun ban by modifying the TEC-9 into the
TEC-DC9.4' In legal terms, this "circumvention" allowed the
court to find, at the demurrer stage, that Navegar, Inc. knew or
should have known that their product was particularly attractive to
criminals and that it knew or should have known that the product
would be used in criminal activities.49 Therefore, the court did not
47. In re 101 Cal. St., No. 959316 (Super. Ct. S.F. County Apr. 10, 1995) (opinion and
order sustaining certain defendants' demurrers in part and overruling others in part).
48. The plaintiff alleged, and the court agreed, that the TEC-DC9 was simply a TEC-9
with insignificant modifications and that both weapons were, for all practical purposes, the
same. See id. at 4 n.4, 7. Consequently, the court included the TEC-DC9 within the scope
of the AWCA's ban even though it was not specifically enumerated within the statute. See
id. This inclusion by the court, on its own initiative, will be discussed more fully below,
49. In its discussion of the plaintiffs' negligence theory, the court stated:
Negligence turns on the concepts of "duty" and the "standard of care" that a rea-
sonable person must exercise. The Court's task in determining duty is to evaluate
generally whether the type of conduct in question is reasonably foreseeable and so
likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability should be imposed on
the negligent party.
Id. at 14 (citing Ballard v. Urbine, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 572-73 n.6, 715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6, 224
Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 n.6 (1986)). The court then concluded that "[t]he standard of care re-
quired depends on the circumstances." Id.
In Ballard the court discussed when a duty should and should not be imposed based
on the circumstances of a given case. In particular, the Ballard court stated that the general
rule in California is that "all persons have a duty 'to use ordinary care to prevent others be-
ing injured as the result of their conduct."' Ballard, 41 Cal. 3d at 572-73 n.6, 715 P.2d at
628 n.6, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 669 n.6 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443
P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968)). The court went on to enumerate those factors
that California courts consider when determining whether a manufacturer has a duty to use
ordinary care to prevent injury. Those factors are:
ULTRAHAZARDOUS PRODUCTS LIABILITY
rely on a simple negligent entrustment claim but found determina-
tive that the plaintiffs framed their negligence theory with specific
regard to the defendant's attempted circumvention of the
AWCA. ° Without Navegar, Inc.'s alleged circumvention, the
plaintiffs' negligence claim would have failed .
2. Strict products liability: an examination of design and
manufacturing defect theories and their value to well-made
gun plaintiffs
Under strict products liability, product manufacturers, 52 retail-
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plain-
tiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's con-
duct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with re-
sulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.
Id. (citing Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100) (emphasis
omitted).
After the 101 California Street court stated the rule from Ballard-that there are
circumstances when the general rule of duty is not applied-the court found that no depar-
ture from the general rule was appropriate for the TEC-DC9 manufacturer in the shooting at
issue. See In re 101 Cal. St, No. 959316 at 15. In making this determination the court
stated:
Plaintiffs allege that the harm they suffered was precisely that which was foresee-
able by [the manufacturer's] conduct. They also allege that there was a direct
connection between [the manufacturer's] activities and plaintiff's injuries, that
[the manufacturer's] conduct in attempting to circumvent the AWCA and then
intentionally marketing the TEC-DC9 in California to criminals was morally of-
fensive, and that the legislature has specifically set the policy of preventing future
harm for the unsupervised use of assault weapons. These allegations, taken as
true and viewed in light of the policy mandated by the AWCA, state a claim for
negligence against [the manufacturer].
Id. (citation omitted). This statement makes clear, as does the tenor of the Order, that the
AWCA is a substantial, if not determinative, factor in finding a duty on behalf of the TEC-
DC9 manufacturer. Without the statute, it is highly questionable whether the court would
have found a duty at all.
50. Like the court in 101 California Street, other courts have allowed well-made gun
cases based on theories of negligent entrustment when a specific state or federal gun statute
has been violated or circumvented. However, unlike 101 California Street, these cases dis-
cuss the liability of the retail seller, not the manufacturer. See Franco v. Bunyard, 547
S.W.2d 91, 93 (Ark. 1977) (stating that gun seller's violation of federal gun control law is
evidence of negligence); Rubin v. Johnson, 550 N.E.2d 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that retailer's violation of gun control law is negligence per se).
51. "Accordingly, this opinion does not consider whether, in the absence of the
AWCA, plaintiffs' theories of strict liability (indeed, plaintiffs' theories of negligence and
negligence per se as well) would survive demurrer." In re 101 Cal. St, No. 959316 at 8
n.12.
52. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
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ers,53 wholesalers, and distributor s 4 can be held liable by any pur-
chaser, nonpurchasing user or consumer,5 or bystander.56  Allow-
able recovery includes damages for all physical injuries to person5
7
and property 8 caused by any product such entities manufacture,
sell, or distribute. Such liability arises from three theories: design
defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn." These theories
are powerful tools for recovery when the product at issue does not
perform as designed, fails to meet manufacturing or design specifi-
cations, fails to meet certain levels of safety expectations, or simply
malfunctions.6° However, these theories provide no method of re-
covery in the case of well-made guns. The following is a brief
summary of strict products liability under the theories of design
and manufacturing defects with accompanying discussions of how
suits by well-made gun plaintiffs fail under both.
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,2 the California Su-
preme Court adopted the rule of strict products liability as follows:
"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
53. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
54. See Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 445, 220 Cal. Rptr. 895
(1985); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968);
Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44,46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
55. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (holding a
"manufacturer strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being").
56. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969) ("If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection
than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foresee-
able .... In short, the bystander is in greater need of protection from defective products
which are dangerous ... ").
57. See Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896; 6 B.E. WTKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1295 (9th ed. 1988).
58. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
WrrKIN, supra note 57, § 1296.
59. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972);
Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. Recovery based on fail-
ure to warn is outside the scope of this Article.
60. Plaintiffs can pursue concurrent claims under negligence and strict products liabil-
ity for defective products. See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 387, 482
P.2d 681, 686, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 774 (1971).
61. This is the situation at bar in 101 California Street and the topic of this Article; the
plaintiffs did not plead any theories of strict products liability under design or manufactur-
ing defects.
62. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing."' 3 This pronouncement focuses a plaintiff's case on proving
the existence of a product "defect" within the meaning of Green-
man.64 In California a plaintiff can make such proof by showing ei-
ther a design or manufacturing defect, or both. '
A manufacturing defect exists when the product at issue dif-
fers from the manufacturer's intended result or differs from appar-
ently identical products from the same manufacturer. 6  A design
defect exists where a product fails to perform as safely as an ordi-
nary consumer would expect when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner or where there is a risk of danger in-
herent in the design of the product that outweighs the benefits of
that design. 7 In other words, a manufacturing defect occurs when
the product leaves the production line but fails to comport with the
manufacturing and design blueprints, and a design defect exists
when the product leaves the production line meeting all design and
manufacturing specifications but is nevertheless found defective. 
6
63. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
64. See Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 135, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
65. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 427, 573 P.2d 443, 952, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 234 (1978) ("We held in Cronin that a plaintiff satisfies his burden of proof un-
der Greenman, in both a 'manufacturing defect' and 'design defect' context, when he
proves the existence of a 'defect' and that such defect was a proximate cause of injuries.").
66. See id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
In general, a manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because a
defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or
from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line. For example, when
a product comes off the assembly line in a substandard condition it has incurred a
manufacturing defect.
Id.
67. See id. at 429-31, 573 P.2d at 454-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37. The court stated:
First, our cases establish that a product may be found defective in design if the
plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
ner....
... [Second,] a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies
ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight.., the jury finds that the
risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such
design....
... [In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh such risks] a
jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of the danger posed
by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the me-
chanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternate design.
Id. (footnote omitted). The first test is called the consumer expectation test, and the second
test is called the risk-utility test. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
68. In addition, a plaintiff must also establish the following four elements: (1) the de-
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However, a manufacturer is not required to deliver a product that
is accident-proof. 9
A well-made gun cannot be defective under a theory of manu-
facturing defect. By definition, a well-made gun has met all manu-
facturing specifications and design requirements-hence the des-
ignation well-made. It does not differ from the manufacturer's
intended result or from apparently identical products from the
same manufacturer. Therefore, a manufacturing defect theory is
not a viable theory of recovery for a plaintiff when a well-made
gun is the cause of injury.
The unavailability of the manufacturing defect theory of re-
covery leaves only the possibility of proving design defect under
either the consumer expectation or risk-utility test. In California,
however, a well-made gun plaintiff will most certainly fail under
both.
First, under the consumer expectation approach, the plaintiff
cannot show that a well-made firearm fails to perform as safely as
an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner. A well-made gun does not con-
tain dangers uncontemplated by the ordinary consumer. Rather,
its inherent dangers are common knowledge, and it performs as
the average consumer expects every time. Therefore, plaintiffs
fendant manufactured the product; (2) the defect existed when the product left the defen-
dant's possession; (3) the defect was a cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the injury re-
sulted from a reasonably foreseeable use of the product. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
69. See Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1974).
70. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225.
71. See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying
Florida law, the court declined to impose strict liability on the manufacturer of a .22 caliber
pistol used by a husband to kill his wife where there were no design defects and the gun
performed exactly as it was supposed to perform); Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d
1326 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying California law, the court held the manufacturer of a .25 cali-
ber automatic handgun was not strictly liable for injuries sustained by a woman intention-
ally shot by her husband because the handgun was not defective in design, it performed as
intended, and the benefits of the design outweighed the risks inherent in the design);
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 "F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law, the court
held a manufacturer of a .25 caliber handgun used to injure and kill people during criminal
activity was not liable because there was no design defect, the gun functioned as intended,
and the dangers were obvious and well known); Riordan v. International Armament Corp.,
477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding manufacturer of handguns used by criminals
to kill plaintiffs' decedent was not strictly liable because there was no design defect based
on size and concealability where such alleged defect did not cause the guns to fall to operate
in a reasonably intended manner); Strickland v. Fowler, 499 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding plaintiffs could not recover, as a matter of law, under consumer expectation test as
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intentionally injured by such a gun, flawlessly made with no hidden
design defects, cannot successfully base their theory of recovery on
the consumer expectation test.72
Turning to the risk-utility approach, the applicable balancing
test appears, at first examination, to provide well-made gun plain-
tiffs with a chance for recovery. This "chance" is based primarily
on the novel burden-shifting approach pioneered in Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co. 73 In affirming the use of the risk-utility test to de-
termine whether a product defect exists, the Barker court an-
nounced an unprecedented burden-shifting approach: Once the
plaintiff establishes that the design of the product is the proximate
cause of the damages at issue, the burden of proof shifts to the de-
fendant to show that the design's utility outweighs its risk.74
With respect to a well-made firearm, this would mean the
plaintiff would only have to show that the manufacturer's act or
omission in producing the firearm was the proximate cause of in-
jury before the burden shifts.75 Initially the plaintiff's burden of
proof presents two obstacles. First, there must be a causative link
between the alleged design defect and the injury, and second, the
plaintiff must overcome allegations that the shooter's intentional
acts are superseding causes terminating the gun manufacturer's li-
ability.76  Only if the plaintiff overcomes these obstacles will the
burden shift to the manufacturer allowing the jury to balance risk
the guns at issue functioned precisely as designed, and dangers were obvious and well
known to all members of the consuming public); King v. R.G. Indus., 451 N.W.2d 874
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that where criminal shot mother and son, resulting in
mother's death and rendering son a paraplegic, manufacturer of Saturday Night Special
entitled to summary judgment since there was no allegation that the particular gun did not
function properly at the time it was discharged).
72. Similarly, tobacco manufacturers have also avoided liability for cancers resulting
from cigarette smoking under the consumer expectation test because smokers are generally
aware of the dangers of tobacco. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 481-82.
73. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
74. See id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury
was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden should appropriately
shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product is
not defective. Moreover, inasmuch as this conclusion flows from our determina-
tion that the fundamental public policies embraced in Greenman dictate that a
manufacturer who seeks to escape liability for an injury proximately caused by its
product's design on a risk-benefit theory should bear the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that its product should not be judged defective, the defendant's bur-
den is one affecting the burden of proof, rather than simply the burden of produc-
ing evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
75. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 488-89.
76. See id. at 491.
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against utility.7 In other words, only if the plaintiff can show cau-
sation will the innovation of Barker's burden-shifting be realized.
However, further examination reveals that well-made gun
plaintiffs cannot harness the consumer-oriented approach adopted
in Barker under any circumstances. California Civil Code §
1714.478 specifically limits the risk-utility test with respect to prod-
ucts liability actions involving firearms and ammunition. Section
1714.4(a) provides that "no firearm or ammunition shall be
deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the
product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to
cause serious injury, damage, or death when discharged."79 Fur-
thermore, § 1714(b) provides that:
(1) The potential of a firearm or ammunition to cause se-
rious injury, damage, or death when discharged does not
make the product defective in design.
(2) Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a
firearm or ammunition are not proximately caused by its
potential to cause serious injury, damage, or death, but
are proximately caused by the actual discharge of the
productY
Thus, in one fell swoop, the legislature ruled out a well-made gun
plaintiff's possible recovery under the theory of design defect.
With § 1714.4(b)(2), the Legislature determined that when a per-
son is shot with a firearm of any kind, the proximate cause of the
injury is not the design of the firearm. This means that the burden-
shifting approach approved by Barker is useless to the well-made
gun plaintiff. Further, with § 1714.4(a), the legislature determined
that no firearm can be found defective in design under a risk utility
examination, eliminating the risk-utility test altogether in the well-
made gun case. Finally, in a more far-reaching statement,
§ 1714.4(b)(1) commands that a well-made gun is not, as a matter
of law, defective in design.
Consequently, suits by well-made gun plaintiffs fail under
California's innovative risk-utility approach as well as the con-
sumer expectation test.
3. The theory of ultrahazardous activities, its application in cases
77. See id.
78. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1985).
79. Id. § 1714.4(a).
80. Id. § 1714.4(b).
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of well-made firearms, and its use in 101 California Street
The final legal theory discussed in this Article is strict liability
through ultrahazardous activities.8' Under this theory individuals
or entities are held strictly liable when their actions create a suffi-
ciently serious risk of danger that cannot be eliminated even with
the exercise of due care.2 This absolute liability is based on the
"recognition of the risk inherent in the undertaking despite the ex-
ercise of due care" and that "liability for the loss is placed upon
the party best able to shoulder it.'4
Under the ultrahazardous activities theory, the court, rather
than the jury, determines whether an activity is ultrahazardous
In making its determination the court considers the following six
factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land, or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the
harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d)
extent to which the activity is not a matter of common us-
age; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to
the community is outweighed by its dangerous attrib-
utes.
86
A classic example of an activity which falls within the doctrine is
blasting with explosives in a city or other densely populated area.8
In 101 California Street, the plaintiffs argued that the combi-
nation of the following activities constituted an ultrahazardous ac-
tivity: (1) manufacturing the TEC-DC9, "a weapon of mass de-
81. Ultrahazardous activities are now referred to as "abnormally dangerous activities"
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
This Article uses the term ultrahazardous activities because the new legal theory it espouses,
ultrahazardous products liability, borrows its title directly from the ultrahazardous phrase-
ology rather than the "abnormally dangerous" phraseology.
82. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr.
128, 137 (1967) (finding that defendant could be held strictly liable for firing a fuel rocket
which caused seismic vibrations resulting in damage to plaintiff's property).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing WiLLLAm L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 318 (2d ed. 1955)).
85. See Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 228 Cal. App. 3d 980, 983, 279 Cal. Rptr. 231,
232 (1991); SKF Farms v. Superior Ct., 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 906, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497, 499
(1984).
86. RBSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
87. See McGrath v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 576, 46 P.2d 981,
982-83 (1935); McKenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 104 Cal. App. 538, 286 P. 445 (1930).
1573
1574 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
struction," and the high capacity ammunition magazine used in the
killing; (2) the manufacturer's decision to modify the TEC-9 into
the TEC-DC9 through "insignificant" changes designed to avoid
California's ban on the AWCA; and (3) the conscious decision to
market the weapon directly to criminals." The court supported
this theory. It noted, and the plaintiffs agreed, that the act of
manufacturing the gun or the magazines by itself did not constitute
an ultrahazardous activity, nor did the act of marketing an other-
wise potentially dangerous product.89 Rather, it was the combina-
tion of the above three factors that allowed the ultrahazardous
theory to proceed.0
As it did in allowing the claim for negligent entrustment to go
forward, the court relied heavily on the AWCA and the defen-
dant's attempted circumvention of it in discussing the six ultrahaz-
ardous activity factors.9' In fact, the court specifically stated that
its "opinion does not consider whether, in the absence of the
AWCA, plaintiffs' [theories] of strict liability ... would survive
demurrer." 92
The broader and more important question that arises from 101
California Street's reliance on the AWCA is whether suits by other
well-made gun plaintiffs injured or killed by weapons not properly
included within the AWCA's ban would survive demurrer on
claims of ultrahazardous activities and negligent entrustment. If
the order of the court in 101 California Street is any indication, the
answer is most certainly no.93
Consequently, because the plaintiffs were forced to phrase
their claim of ultrahazardous activities so narrowly to encompass
88. See In re 101 Cal. St., No. 959316 at 6-14 (Super. Ct. S.F. County Apr. 10, 1995)
(opinion and order sustaining some defendants' demurrers in part and overruling others in
part).
89. See id. at 7.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 8 n.12.
92. Id.
93. Most jurisdictions have found that the sale and distribution of firearms is not an
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. See Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
771 (D.N.M. 1987) (refusing to hold manufacturer of handguns liable under the ultrahaz-
ardous activity doctrine); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985) (holding
that the manufacture, sale, and marketing of a small, easily concealable handgun does not
constitute an abnormally dangerous activity); Diggles v. Horwitz, 765 S.W.2d 839, 841
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "the manufacture or sale of a handgun had not been rec-
ognized as an ultrahazardous activity"); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d
661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the manufacture, distribution, or sale of a handgun
is not a high-risk, ultrahazardous activity).
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aspects of the AWCA and the manufacturer's alleged attempt to
circumvent that statute, and because the court relied so heavily on
its own interpretation of the AWCA, the ultrahazardous activities
claim in 101 California Street does not create a generally available
theory of recovery for other well-made gun plaintiffs. As with
negligent entrustment, these plaintiffs are surviving on a very thin,
factually intensive line that depends on the critical interpretation
and use of the AWCA.
B. The Potential Effect of the AWCA on Civil Code § 1714's
Elimination of the Risk-Utility Test for Well-Made Gun Plaintiffs
In 1974 California Civil Code § 1714 eliminated the use of the
risk-utility test to prove the design defect of a well-made firearm.
In 1989, however, the enactment of the Roberti-Roos Assault
Weapons Control Act94 (AWCA) may have reversed § 1714's im-
pact. In other words, victims of well-made firearms may be able to
overcome the far reaching ban of § 1714 and use the risk-utility
test to sustain their burden in a products liability suit.
The AWCA is a section of the California Penal Code banning
specifically enumerated assault weapons and firearms from the
State of California and criminalizing certain contraventions of that
ban.95 Specifically, any party who
within this state, manufacturers or causes to be manufac-
tured, distributes, transports, or imports into the state,
keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives
or lends any assault weapon.., is guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for four, six, or eight years."
The AWCA then defines the term "assault weapon" with certain
listed firearms,9 including the Intratec TEC-9, the predecessor to
94. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12277 (West 1992).
95. See id.
96. Id. § 12280(a)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
97. Id. § 12276.
All of the following specified rifles: (1) All AK series including, but not limited
to, the models identified as follows: (A) Made in China AK, AKM, AKS, AK47,
AK47S, 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S. (B) Norinco 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S. (C) Poly
Technologies AKS and AK47. (D) MAADI AK47 and ARM. (2) UZI and Galil.
(3) Baretta AR-70. (4) CETME Sporter. (5) Colt AR-15 series. (6) Daewoo K-I,
K-2, Max 1, Max 2, AR 100, and ARI 1C. (7) Fabrique Nationale FAL, LAR,
FNC, 308 Match, and Sporter. (8) MAS 223. (9) HK-91, HK-93, HK-94, HK-
PSG-1. (10) The following MAC types: (A) RPB Industries Inc. sM1O and sM11.
(13) SWD Incorporated MI 1. (11) SKS with detachable magazine. (12) SIG AMT,
PE-57, SG 550, SG 551. (13) Springfield Armory BM59 and SAR-48. (14) Ster-
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the TEC-DC9. The legislature based this assault weapon ban on
the following legislative findings, enumerated in the AWCA itself:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the prolif-
eration and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the
health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state. The
Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in
Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has
such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its
function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is
substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used
to kill and injure human beings. It is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this chapter to place restrictions
on the use of assault weapons and to establish a registra-
tion and permit procedure for their lawful sale and pos-
session. It is not, however, the intent of the Legislature
by this chapter to place restrictions on the use of those
weapons which are primarily designed and intended for
hunting, target practice, or other legitimate sports or rec-
reational activities.
98
The AWCA's assault weapon ban and the legislature's new
finding of related health and safety risks" have an uncertain effect
on the legislature's old determination, enumerated in California
Civil Code § 1714, that firearms are not defective in design as a
matter of law. Does the AWCA implicitly repeal Civil Code §
1714? The fact that the Legislature restricted the assault weapons
specified in the AWCA on the "finding that each firearm has such
a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a
legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially out-
weighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human
beings"' rings of a risk-utility balancing that is specifically con-
ling MK-6. (15) Steyer AUG. (16) Valmet M62S, M71S, and M78S. (17) Ar-
malite AR-180. (18) Bushmaster Assault Rifle. (19) Calico M-900. (20) J&R
ENG M-68. (21) Weaver Arms Nighthawk. (b) All of the following specified
pistols: (1) UZI. (2) Encom MP-9 and MP-45. (3) The following MAC types: (A)
RPB Industries Inc. sMi0 and sM1 1. (B) SWD Incorporated M-1 1. (C) Advance
Armament Inc. M-1 1. (D) Military Armament Corp. Ingram M-1 1. (4) Intratec
TEC-9. (5) Sites Spectre. (6) Sterling MK-7. (7) Calico M-950. (8) Bushmaster
Pistol. (c) All of the following specified shotguns: (1) Franchi SPAS 12 and LAW
12. (2) Striker 12. (3) The Streetsweeper type S/S Inc. SS/12. (d) Any firearm
declared by the court pursuant to Section 12276.5 to be an assault weapon that is
specified as an assault weapon in a list promulgated pursuant to Section 12276.5.
Id. (emphasis added).
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trary to Civil Code § 1714. While the implicit legislative effects of
the AWCA are not central to this Article, they are nonetheless
important and must be noted in passing. If the AWCA effectively
overrules the legislature's previous determination that firearms are
not defective as a matter of law, the theory of design defect may
again be open to well-made gun plaintiffs.
1. 101 California Street's reliance on the AWCA to maintain
plaintiffs' strict liability theories
As discussed above, the 101 California Street court relied
heavily on the AWCA in allowing the plaintiffs to survive demur-
rer.'O' Under the theory of negligent entrustment, the court used
the statute to find a duty, the most basic element of that theory.
With regard to ultrahazardous activities, the court used the statute
to establish the very combination of activities it found were ultra-
hazardous, as well as the several other legal elements required un-
der that theory.
However, in utilizing the AWCA, the court could not rely on
the statute's specifically enumerated assault weapons because the
TEC-DC9 is not on the list.'2 Rather, the court used the caveat
found in section 12276(d) of the AWCA to determine that the
TEC-DC9 was an assault weapon within the statute's meaning.103
101. See In re 101 Cal. St., No. 959316 at 6-14 (Super. Ct. S.F. County Apr. 10, 1995)
(opinion and order sustaining some defendants' demurrers in part and overruling others in
part).
102. See id. at 4 n.4 (noting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) does
not specifically list the TEC-DC9).
103. There is a caveat in the AWCA stating that an "assault weapon" as defined in §
12276 of the AWCA can include, in addition to the firearms already listed in the statute,
"[a]ny firearm declared by the court pursuant to Section 12276.5 to be an assault weapon
that is specified as an assault weapon in a list promulgated pursuant to Section 12276.5."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276(d).
Turning to § 12276.5, it provides, in relevant part:
(a) Upon request by the Attorney General... the superior court shall issue a dec-
laration of temporary suspension of the manufacture, sale, distribution, transpor-
tation, or importation into the state, or the giving or lending of a firearm alleged
to be an assault weapon within the meaning of Section 12276 because the firearm
is either of the following:
(1) Another model by the same manufacturer or a copy by another manu-
facturer of an assault weapon listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 12276
which is identical to one of the assault weapons listed in those subdivisions ex-
cept for slight modifications or enhancements including, but not limited to: a
folding or retractable stock; adjustable sight; case deflector for left-handed shoot-
ers; shorter barrel; wooden, plastic or metal stock; larger magazine size; different
caliber provided that the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire; or bayonet mount ....
(2) A firearm first manufactured or sold to the general public in California
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Specifically, the court stated:
Plaintiffs allege that in response to the AWCA, [the
manufacturer] modified the TEC-9 in ways immaterial to
its assault function and re-named the new weapon the
TEC-DC9. This effort does not take the TEC-DC9 out of
the AWCA, however, as the Act specifically provides that it
covers the listed weapons "and any other models which are
only variations of those weapons with minor differences,
regardless of the manufacturer.""'4
Without this caveat, the court loses its basis to find the TEC-DC9
within the prohibition of the AWCA and has no grounds upon
which to deny the defendants' demurrers. More specifically, the
plaintiffs would have had no legal theories to support their
claims.'
2. The California Court of Appeal is split on whether the 101
California Street court appropriately used the AWCA
The California Court of Appeal is now split on whether a trial
court, on its own initiative, can properly add the TEC-DC9 to the
list of assault weapons banned under the AWCA. In Harrott v.
County of Kings'° the trial court, on its own initiative, found a
Clayco brand rifle the functional equivalent of an AK46. As the
Clayco was not enumerated in the AWCA and the AK47 was, the
trial court included the Clayco within the AWCA's ban. On ap-
peal, the trial court was reversed because the appellate court found
that only the attorney general can add a firearm to the list of
banned assault weapons, not the trial court by its own action.'07
after June 1, 1989, which has been redesigned, renamed, or renumbered from one
of the firearms listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 12276, or which is
manufactured or sold by another company under a licensing agreement to manu-
facture or sell one of the firearms listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section
12276 ....
Id. § 12276.5 (West 1992).
104. In re 101 Cal. St., No. 959316 at 4 n.4 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276(3)(f))
(emphasis added).
105. See id. ("Accordingly, this opinion does not consider whether, in the absence of the
AWCA, plaintiffs' theories of strict liability (indeed, plaintiffs' [theory] of negligence...
as well) would survive demurrer.").
106. 46 Cal. App. 4th 592, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (5th Dist. 1996).
107. Id. at 599, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
In sum, after review of the Act as a whole and of its legislative history, we con-
clude the Legislature did not intend for local law enforcement agencies to make
the initial determination whether a specific firearm is an assault weapon. Such a
determination is made by the Legislature, through inclusion in section 12276, or
by the trial court, but only after the filing of a petition by the Attorney General.
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The court of appeal in People v. Dingman,"8 however, im-
pliedly held that a trial court can include a weapon within the
AWCA if it merely interprets the enumerated list in the AWCA to
include the weapon at issue, even though it contains slight altera-
tions, rather than using the caveat found in 12276.5.1° As Ding-
man was decided after Harrott,"' it appears that the court of ap-
peal was trying to avoid the reach of Harrott and provide trial
courts with the ability to do the same. Therefore, the propriety of
the 101 California Street court's action in including the TEC-DC9
within the AWCA remains a legal issue that will certainly be
challenged.
The California Supreme Court has granted review in Har-
rott.1 In so doing, it will resolve the conflict between the two ap-
pellate opinions with respect to a trial court's ability to define ad-
ditional firearms as assault weapons within the meaning of the
AWCA. Further, it will also determine whether the court in 101
California Street exceeded its authority in adding the TEC-DC9 to
the list of banned weapons under the AWCA, and therefore, indi-
rectly determine whether the plaintiffs' claims will actually survive
to trial and thereafter.
3. Under the different theories of negligence and strict products
By requiring the Attorney General to file the petition, two layers of review are en-
sured before a firearm is declared to be an assault weapon: review by the Attor-
ney General's office and review in the trial court. This double review helps en-
sure that the Legislature's prosecution of assault weapons is appropriately
enforced. Were we to find otherwise, one county, given a receptive judge, could
have a plethora of weapons declared to be assault weapons, a declaration binding
on the citizenry of the entire state, even against the express wish of the Attorney
General, who represents the State of California as a whole.
Id.
108. 47 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 211 (1996).
109. See id. In Dingman the defendant purchased his gun with a fixed magazine, and
argued that such a weapon was not within the scope of the AWCA because the AWCA only
contemplated the defendant's type of weapon if it was originally manufactured with a de-
tachable magazine. See id. at 1071, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. The Court of Appeal inter-
preted the AWCA on its own to include the defendant's modified gun.- Id. at 1073-79, 55
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213-17. In doing so the court held that the ban on defendant's type of
weapon "with [a] detachable magazine" included a weapon altered to have a detachable
magazine, even if manufactured with a fixed magazine. Id. This action is contrary to that
in Harrolt, which required the Attorney General to include different weapons within the
ban.
110. Harrott was decided on June 18, 1996. See Harrott v. County of Kings, 46 Cal.
App. 4th 592, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1996). Dingman was decided July 29, 1996. See
Dingman 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1068, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
111. Harrott v. County of Kings, 923 P.2d 766, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (1996) (granting
petition for review).
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liability, causation remains a critical issue
Under all of the theories discussed above, causation is a criti-
cally important element. 12  Whether the claim is based in negli-
gence or strict liability, the rules of actual and proximate cause
must be satisfied."3 With respect to a well-made gun case, "[t]his
requires that the plaintiff show that some aspect of the [firearm's]
... design caused his injury, even though the weapon was manufac-
tured flawlessly and contained no hidden dangers."' 1 4 The true ob-
stacle in establishing this element is overcoming the doctrine of
superseding causes.' When a "plaintiff's injuries resulted from
the intentional criminal acts of another, the plaintiff probably will
be unable to demonstrate the proximate cause connection ...
[T]he handgun manufacturer's claim of superseding cause [will]
prevail in most jurisdictions.' 6
At first glance, this proximate cause requirement appears
surmountable in California because of certain developments in the
area of superseding causes. Specifically, California has rejected
the blanket rule that an intervening criminal act is by its very na-
ture a superseding cause." 7 Instead, it has adopted the Restate-
112. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (holding manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by
their products); Paverud v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 189 Cal. App. 3d 858, 863, 234
Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1987) (finding that trial court committed reversible error by failing to
instruct the jury on superseding causation when employer's negligence may have been a
superseding cause); Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 926-27, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 95, 100-01 (1977) (finding no causal connection between allegedly defective seat belt
and plaintiff's injuries arising out of car crash); Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal.
App. 3d 188, 193-95, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281, 285-87 (1971) (holding it was error to refuse in-
struction on concurrent causes). Remember also that the burden-shifting rule defined in
Barker, which states that if the plaintiff proves that his injury was proximately caused by
the product's design the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the product was not defec-
tive, relies on the application of the rules of causation. See supra note 74 and accompany-
ing text.
113. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
114. Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 491.
115. See id. at 493.
116. Id. (footnote omitted).
117. See Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 777, 285 P.2d 269, 272 (1955) (holding
that defendant's duty to plaintiff included protection from the intentional misconduct by
unauthorized third persons and thus, such misconduct was not a superseding cause of in-
jured party's harm); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 218, 157 P.2d 372, 374
(1945) (finding that action of intervening agency was not a superseding cause exonerating
defendant from negligence when what occurred was reasonably foreseeable); Rosh v. Cave
Imaging Sys., 26 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1236, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 142 (1994) (finding se-
curity company's repeated failure to remove terminated employee from the premises was
substantial cause of employee's subsequent assault on manager who had fired him); Cam-
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ment's formulation that "'[i]f the likelihood that a third person
may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."''1n
However, any potential application of this evolved rule does
not extend to well-made firearm cases. California Civil Code §
1714.4 states that, with respect to all products liability actions,
"[i]njuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm or
ammunition are not proximately caused by its potential to cause
serious injury, damage, or death, but are proximately caused by
the actual discharge of the product." '119
Consequently, the legislature returned the applicable causa-
tion rule to its former state ° with respect to gun plaintiffs, taking
away what the courts had developed. As a result, causation re-
mains a thorn in the side of well-made gun plaintiffs and will likely
defeat most, if not all, claims against manufacturers.
In 101 California Street the plaintiffs survived demurrer with
respect to causation because of the AWCA and their carefully
crafted theory aimed at the defendant's act of marketing the TEC-
DC9 in contravention of the AWCA. When the defendant gun
manufacturer challenged the plaintiffs' claims under California
Civil Code §1714.4, the court stated that normally a manufacturer
will not be liable when a user of the product intervenes to create a
hazardous situation but "that scenario changes when the Legisla-
ture enacts a law such as the AWCA."'12 More specifically, be-
podonico v. State Auto Parks, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 803, 807, 89 Cal. Rptr. 270, 273 (1970)
(holding jury instruction stating that if third party's act was extraordinary or abnormal the
original actor's negligence was not proximate cause is reversible error); Terrell v. Key Sys.,
69 Cal. App. 2d 682, 688, 159 P.2d 704, 707 (1945) (holding that it was a jury question
whether defendant's failure to control actions of drunken passengers was proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries).
118. Richardson, 44 Cal. 2d at 777, 285 P.2d at 272 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 449 (1965)).
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(b)(2) (West 1985).
120. The approach of the older cases was that an intervening criminal act or intentional
tort is less foreseeable than an intervening negligent act and ordinarily is a superseding
cause. See Blunk v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 97 Cal. App. 2d 229, 233, 217 P.2d
494, 497 (1950) (finding railway not liable for injury caused by horseplay of fellow em-
ployees because of lack of duty and proximate cause); Angelis v. Foster, 24 Cal. App. 2d
541, 543, 75 P.2d 650, 651 (1938) (sustaining defendant's general demurrer despite negli-
gent failure to provide safe transportation for school child because intervening act of intoxi-
cated automobile driver was sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries).
121. See In re 101 Cal. St, No. 959316 at 12.
122. Id.
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cause the plaintiffs framed their complaint with respect to the
manufacturer's activities-its alleged circumvention of the AWCA
and not the act of designing and manufacturing a dangerous
weapon-the court was able to examine the claims under non-
product liability theories and find its way around California Civil
Code § 1714.4.'2 As the court clearly stated in its Opinion And
Order, "[p]laintiffs do not challenge [the] design; they challenge
[the manufacturer's] decision to market the TEC-DC9 in a way
that made violation of [the AWCA] inevitable. It is this conduct,
not problems with the design of the TEC-DC9, that forms the basis
for plaintiffs' claims."'' 4 Obviously, this finding and the corre-
sponding use of the AWCA will be reviewed by the California Su-
preme Court when it reconciles the current split in Dingman and
Harrott.
121
C. The Creation of a New Cause of Action for Well-Made Firearm
Plaintiffs: Ultrahazardous Products Liability
1. Existing tort law fails to protect well-made gun plaintiffs,
requiring the creation of a new theory of recovery: ultrahazardous
products liability
As this Article has discussed, the current avenues of recovery
under negligence, products liability, and ultrahazardous activities
for victims of well-made firearms are simply too narrow or are
closed altogether. First, plaintiffs must jump through linguistic
hoops in their allegations and pleadings and must articulate com-
plex theories based on a multitude of interrelated actions, any one
of which standing alone would not impose liability. Second, if the
AWCA or similar statute is unavailable, it is doubtful that even
artful pleading could survive demurrer under existing law.
123. See id. at 12 n.18.
124. Id.
125. See Harriet Chang, Judge Drops Suit Against Gun Maker, S.F. CHRON., May 7,
1997, at A17, available in 1997 WL 6696968. As this Article was going to press, the court
in 101 California Street granted defendant Na'egar, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment
on the issue of causation. In stopping the plaintiffs' case from proceeding, the court found
that there was insufficient evidence to support the legal conclusion that the manufacturer's
alleged circumvention of the AWCA, the alleged ultra-hazardous activity, was the cause of
the plantiffs' injuries. This ruling underscores the very premise behind this Article's ad-
vancement of a new cause of action for victims of well-made firearms: current law presents
so many problems for such vicitms that the only path to recovery, and manufacturer ac-
countability, will be wrought through an evolution of current law.
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Even if the plaintiff is able to achieve these pleading acrobat-
ics, causation promises almost certain failure. As a direct result of
the Legislature's pronouncement, a firearm manufacturer's action
or inaction is not the cause of a well-made gun plaintiff's injuries in
a products liability action.12 Even more devastating is the legisla-
ture's determination that well-made firearms are altogether ex-
cluded from the purview of strict products liability under a design
defect theory by defining such products as not defective as a mat-
ter of law. Therefore, unless a plaintiff seeks to focus, as did the
plaintiffs in 101 California Street, on a defendant's evasion of the
gun-ban statute, the well-made gun plaintiff has no avenue of re-
covery.127
This situation is unacceptable. The law cannot allow the
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers of firearms,
or any other party involved in the chain of distribution, to continue
to market their products of mass destruction and death to the gen-
eral public with impunity. These entities freely dump their mili-
tary-style assault products into a nonmilitary civilian market, tar-
geting any average citizen or criminal that will purchase their
goods. For example, licensed firearm dealers sell an estimated 7.5
million guns per year'2 and there are an estimated 1 million semi-
automatic assault weapons in private hands in the United States.
129
In 1994 alone 38,505 Americans were killed with firearms, averag-
ing 105 people every day.'
Because gun-producing entities are immune from almost all
civil liability-save for a gun that fires sideways or explodes in the
user's hand 3 -their massive sales and revenues remain unencum-
bered by any type of safety procedures or requirements. Rather,
they can bottom-out their wholesale and retail prices in order to
sell as many of their products as possible because they are not
126. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(b)(2) (West 1985). Of course, this does not bear on a
negligence cause of action.
127. Even if a well-made gun plaintiff does have recourse to a gun-ban statute, the pro-
priety of using such statute, as the plaintiffs have in 101 California Street, is untested on
appeal.
128. See Ray Moseley, Handgun Ban Garnering Support in Britain, CH. TRm., Sept. 3,
1996, at 11.
129. See Jim Stewart & Andrew Alexander, Assault Weapons Muscling in on the Front
Lines of Crime, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 21, 1989 at Al.
130. National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Ad-
vance Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1994, 45 MONTHLY VrrAL STAT. REP., no. 3,
Supp., Sept. 30, 1996, at 9.
131. See supra-note 28.
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faced with the same constraints as other consumer goods manufac-
turers in this state.
For example, in 1993 the cost of firearm injuries in medical
expenses and lost productivity was estimated at more than $5 bil-
lion, with an additional $13 billion attributable to lost quality of
life. 3 In 1993 4,888 people suffered gunshot wounds, eighty per-
cent of whom could not pay for their medical care, shifting the cost
to the public.'3 This is a very significant figure when the average
cost of treating a bullet wound victim is $23,750. 
13
Entities which produce and market firearms must be held ac-
countable when their products achieve their desired goal of death
and mutilation. Like all other product manufacturers, they must
be held to answer in the courts of law of this state for the damages
their products cause.
Since existing tort law fails to articulate a cause of action that
can reach the untouchable manufacturers of well-made firearms, a
new theory of recovery must be developed in California. At pres-
ent these manufacturers skate the thin line of immunity that sepa-
rates the independent theories of negligence, ultrahazardous ac-
tivities, and design defects under strict products liability. When
aimed at the firearm itself, none of these theories work, although
aspects of each are applicable.
However, a new cause of action formulated from the theories
of ultrahazardous activities and strict products liability could exact
the accountability and responsibility consumers need and expect in
California. That new cause of action is Ultrahazardous Products
Liability (UPL).
In borrowing from the law of ultrahazardous activities, UPL
utilizes the concept that some products are so inherently danger-
ous that strict liability must be imposed when those products cause
injury, even though they are legal and serve some social good.3
Thus, UPL focuses on a product's unavoidable risk of serious and
deadly injury through proper use or consumption.
Of course, the theory of ultrahazardous activities deals with
132. See Robert B. Gunnison, Gun Violence Costing Billions, Report Says: California




136. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr.
128, 137 (1967); 6 B.E. WrriiN, SuMMARYoFCALFORNIA LAW § 1228 (9th ed. 1988).
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actions, not products.137 As such, it is not directly applicable to the
case of a well-made firearm. To augment this shortfall, UPL must
also borrow from the law of strict products liability. Specifically, it
must focus on the tangible product as do the theories of manufac-
turing and design defect. This would allow UPL to consider the
firearm product itself and not the actions of its manufacturer in
manufacturing, designing, marketing, and selling its firearm prod-
ucts.
The net result is a theory of recovery that looks at the design
of the product for an inherently ultrahazardous risk of danger that
cannot be eliminated by due care because of the product's nature
and intended purpose and holds its manufacturer strictly liable for
all damages caused by such product. In the most basic sense, the
general theory of UPL may be stated as follows: All parties that
manufacture, market, distribute, sell, or otherwise aid in the deliv-
ery of a product to the public are held strictly liable if that product
is specifically designed to be ultrahazardous38 when properly used
and is ultrahazardous when so used, even though it comports with
all design and manufacturing specifications, is legally produced,
and may serve some social good.
By holding the manufacturers'39 of firearms accountable in this
fashion for the dire consequences caused by their products, a new
era of consumer protection would unfold. A manufacturer would
no longer purposefully design a product meant to be ultrahazard-
ous to both person and property, actively market it to general con-
sumers for profit, and avoid responsibility for the damage it causes.
Rather, as with other product manufacturers, firearm manufactur-
ers would have to build into the product, or its distribution system,
mechanisms to make the product safe for consumers, passive users,
and especially innocent bystanders. If the product cannot be
manufactured or marketed safely, the manufacturer would have to
build such risk into the cost of the product. This would place the
cost of injury, clearly anticipated by the manufacturers of ultra-
hazardous products, on the least cost avoiders-the manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers of such products.'
137. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
138. This term of art will be discussed in great detail below. See discussion infra Part
II.C.4.a.
139. The term "manufacturer" refers to all parties in the chain of manufacturing and dis-
tribution.
140. The "least cost avoider" is the entity that avoids paying the lowest cost that would
have prevented the harm at issue, forcing others to pay a higher cost to avoid or repair the
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2. The historical development of California's consumer protection
law supports ultrahazardous product liability
Support for the creation of UPL is found in the evolution of
California's consumer protection jurisprudence, which has con-
tinuously sought to protect the innocent consumer and bystander
from dangerous products. Beginning with the seminal case
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,'4 the California Supreme
Court adopted the then revolutionary theory of strict products li-
ability. 42 In adopting this theory the court stated that it intended
to "insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves."14
In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp.,'44 the California Supreme
Court announced that a plaintiff in a strict products liability suit is
not required to prove that the product was unreasonably danger-
ous, as the Restatement requires, but simply that the product con-
tained a defect. 45 The court held that requiring a plaintiff to prove
that a product was both unreasonably dangerous and defective was
too great a burden. 146  Consequently, eliminating the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement removed a major hurdle
which prevents plaintiffs from recovering altogether in other ju-
same harm. In the situation of a well-made firearm, the manufacturers are the least cost
avoiders when it comes to preventing or repairing the massive damage that their products
cause. They sell their products to the general consumer population at the cheapest possible
prices with no marketing or distribution safeguards while the Legislature and the taxpayers
are forced to expend tremendous amounts of capital in passing gun legislation and support-
ing hospitals that treat gunshot victims.
141. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
142. The California Supreme Court adopted this theory two years prior to its adoption
by the REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 479.
143. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
144. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
145. See id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. Cronin stated:
In summary, we have concluded that to require an injured plaintiff to prove not
only that the product contained a defect but also that such defect made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer would place a considerably
greater burden upon him than that articulated in Greenman. We believe the
Greenman formulation is consonant with the rationale and development of prod-
ucts liability law in California because it provides a clear and simple test for de-
termining whether the injured plaintiff is entitled to recovery. We are not per-
suaded to the contrary by the formulation of section 402A which inserts the factor
of an "unreasonably dangerous" condition into the equation of products liability.
Id.
146. See id.
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risdictions. 47
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.'4' the California Supreme
Court continued its tradition of consumer protection by announc-
ing that plaintiffs can use two different theories to prove design de-
fect: consumer expectation and risk-utility. 149 Under the first the-
ory, a plaintiff must only that the product at issue did not perform
as an ordinary consumer would have expected.5 Under the sec-
ond theory, the plaintiff is only required to prove that the product
design proximately caused the claimed injuries. Once this is es-
tablished the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
product's design was not defective."' The defendant must then
bear both the burden of proof and persuasion to show for any and
all relevant balancing factors that the benefits of the product as a
whole outweigh the danger inherent in its design. 5  California
pioneered this burden shifting risk-utility approach in Barker and
remains one of the only jurisdictions that has adopted a two-test
approach in design defect cases.'
Other important consumer-oriented developments include the
147. See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Products Liability: Product as Unreasonably
Dangerous or Unsafe Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 54 A.L.R.3d 352, 356
(1973); see, e.g., Kutzler v. AMF Harley Davidson, 550 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (denying liability because motorcycle designed with extra wide gas tank and not
equipped with crash bars was not "unreasonably dangerous"); Brown v. Western Farmers
Ass'n, 521 P.2d 537, 541 (Or. 1974) (holding that purchasers who failed to allege fact
showing that chicken feed was unreasonably dangerous could not recover under strict li-
ability for lost profits); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230
N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 1975) (holding that complaint failed to state a cause of action since
pool described in complaint did not contain an unreasonably dangerous defect).
148. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
149. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. The court further held that
a trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective in design (1)
if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an or-
dinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foresee-
able manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately
caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove.., that on balance the benefits
of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. Addressing the burden of proof issue, the court held that
once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury was proximately
caused by the product's design, the burden should appropriately shift to defendant
to prove, in light of the relevant factors[,] ... that the product is not defectiveL]
... [and] defendant's burden is one affecting the burden of proof, rather than
simply the burden of producing evidence.
Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
153. See Mackarevich, supra note 25, at 482.
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following: (1) an auto manufacturer's engineering design must
take into account that vehicles will collide, that vehicles must pro-
tect consumers from foreseeable crashes's4 and that high-speed
collisions and some degree of consumer misuse are foreseeable;
15 1
(2) experts are not needed to prove a defect exists, especially
where the defect is obvious to the general public; 56 and (3) the use
of an expert witness does not invalidate the use of the consumer
expectation test.7
With regard to ultrahazardous activities, California courts
have imposed liability without fault when a party's activities create
such a serious risk of danger that it is justifiable to place liability of
loss on the party engaging in those activities, regardless of the lack
of culpability.151 In applying this rule California courts hold that no
matter how carefully a party acts, or how socially important the
activity is, if the activity cannot be accomplished without serious




While this brief history is by no means a complete reconstruc-
tion of California's development of consumer protection through
strict products liability and ultrahazardous activity theories, it illus-
trates the essential point that California tort law has been a major
proponent of consumer protection. California was the first juris-
diction to adopt strict products liability as a theory of recovery,
and it is one of the few jurisdictions that rejects the more stringent
requirement that a plaintiff prove that a product is unreasonably
dangerous as well as defective. It is also one of the few jurisdic-
tions to adopt a two-test approach to design defect cases and to use
a burden-shifting approach under the risk-utility test.
Viewed as a whole, California's cutting-edge development of
strict products liability and its adoption of liability for ultrahazard-
ous activities has paved the way for the next evolutionary step in
California law-the genesis of a new theory of recovery that would
154. See Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
155. See Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(1974).
156. See Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 124, 649 P.2d 224, 231,
184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 898 (1982) (noting that an expert is not needed, especially where the
defect is obvious to the general public).
157. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 567 n.4, 882 P.2d 298, 308-09
n.4, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 617-18 n.4 (1994).
158. See 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1230 (9th ed. 1988).
159. See Smith, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
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protect consumers now suffering great loss and injury from ultra-
hazardous products. More specifically, the history of consumer
protection in California naturally leads to the adoption of a theory
of recovery aimed at protecting the many consumers and innocent
bystanders that suffer tens of millions of dollars of damages each
year from well-made firearms. Consequently, the creation of the
theory of UPL, which will impose absolute liability on manufac-
turers for products that are extremely dangerous when properly
consumed, is merited by the history and tradition of California's
consumer protection law.
3. The elements of an ultrahazardous products liability case
To maintain a cause of action under the proposed theory of
UPL, the plaintiff must establish each of the following four ele-
ments. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the first three
elements, and once proven, the burden of proving the remaining
element shifts to the defendant.' Only when the plaintiff satisfies
the burden under the first three elements will the burden shift.
a. element one: the product is ultrahazardous
First, the plaintiff must show that the product in question was
designed to be ultrahazardous when properly used and was ultra-
hazardous when properly used. This element delineates those
products that fall within the purview of UPL and those that do not,
targeting products that rise to the level of ultrahazardous under
the theory of ultrahazardous activities. Included are products that
create such a serious risk of danger through their intentionally de-
signed use that it is justifiable to place liability for any loss caused
by the product on the manufacturer.1 6' This does not include
products that simply are dangerous when improperly used, or even
dangerous when properly used. Rather, UPL targets products in-
tentionally designed to be so dangerous that liability must be im-
posed upon the manufacturers when their intent is realized. In es-
sence, this element seeks to separate products that are merely
160. Cf Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 234 (1978) (holding that the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
product is not defective once plaintiff shows design of product was the cause of injury).
161. Realize that this focus on intentional design incorporates an element of culpability
not required under the theory of ultrahazardous activities. Under the ultrahazardous activity
cause of action, nonintentional conduct, like flying debris from blasting, can give rise to
liability. See McGrath v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 7 Cal. App. 573, 46 P.2d 981 (1935);
McKenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 104 Cal. App. 538, 286 P. 445 (1930).
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dangerous from those that are designed to be ultrahazardous.
When determining whether a given product design is ultra-
hazardous the object of the inquiry will necessarily fall within one
of four separate product categories. The first category is com-
prised of finished products used by the consumer in the same con-
dition as when they left the manufacturer. The second category
encompasses modified products which are a combination of one or
more products. This category includes products that were ultra-
hazardous prior to their modification and those that were not ul-
trahazardous when produced but were designed to be modified
into ultrahazardous products by a third party. The third category
includes products with modifications designed solely to be used in
conjunction with another product or products and that were de-
signed to make such other products ultrahazardous. The final
category includes products that were not designed as ultrahazard-
ous but became ultrahazardous through the unforeseeable altera-
tion of a third party.
Category one would result in liability. When dealing with
categories two and three, the plaintiff must prove that the resulting
modified product was designed to be ultrahazardous or that the
product modification was designed to make another product ultra-
hazardous and that such modified product or product modification
was ultrahazardous when used as intended. It is irrelevant that the
modified product or the product modification was not ultrahaz-
ardous prior *to modification. The final category, on the other
hand, would create no liability for the manufacturer.6 2
In recognizing that product modifications and modified prod-
ucts can be ultrahazardous, UPL can reach products that are not
designed to be ultrahazardous in their own right but are designed
to enhance the danger of another product or are designed to be
made ultrahazardous through the addition of another product.
Including these modified product categories in UPL prevents
manufacturers from avoiding liability by breaking down their
manufacturing process into distinct steps or from ending the manu-
facturing process "early" so that the consumer receives a product
that is not originally ultrahazardous but that is intentionally de-
signed to become ultrahazardous through a simple assembly or
modification procedure. For example, one manufacturer only
produces a gun housing while another manufacturer only produces
162. This category will be addressed below under the doctrine of abnormal alteration.
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the automatic trigger system for that housing. Both independent
parts were purchased separately by the consumer and were not ul-
trahazardous on their own, but were intended by the manufactur-
ers to be assembled together by the consumer. In this example
neither manufacturer produced an ultrahazardous product, but
each produced a product that, when added to the other, created an
ultrahazardous product.
Determining whether a product is ultrahazardous is the most
fundamental element of the plaintiff's case and requires proof of
two distinct characteristics: (1) it was ultrahazardous in its actual
use; and (2) it was designed with the intent to be ultrahazardous in
such use. To test for these two characteristics, the trier of fact
must examine whether a reasonable bystander would perceive the
product as ultrahazardous when used in an intended manner.
When dealing with a product modification or product that was in-
tended to be modified the trier of fact must examine whether a
reasonable bystander would perceive the modified product as ul-
trahazardous under conditions of intended use.
When examining the sensibilities of the reasonable bystander,
the trier of fact should not consider the sensibilities of an average
user of the product at issue but the sensibilities of the average per-
son who may encounter the intended use of the product! The
following factors should be considered in determining whether a
product is ultrahazardous: (1) whether there is a high degree of
risk of harm to person, land, or chattel in the product's designed
use; (2) whether it is likely that the harm from the designed use of
the product or modified product will be great; and (3) the inappro-
priateness of marketing the product or modified product to the
general consumer public.'6 These factors focus on the product's
actual ability to inflict serious or deadly injury, the intent of the
product manufacturer that its product achieve such a result, and
the marketing and sale of such product to an inappropriate con-
sumer class. If the trier of fact cannot affirmatively answer all
three of these questions, the product at issue does not fall within
163. In the assault weapon situation, this average bystander standard prevents the trier of
fact from relying on the sensibilities of the average assault weapon owner, forcing it instead
to rely on the sensibilities of the average person who may encounter the product as a victim
nonuser. Most assault weapon owners would most likely find such a product useful and not
extremely dangerous by virtue of their ownership and accompanying support of assault
weapons.
164. These factors parallel those outlined under the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS §
520 (1965) for abnormally dangerous activities.
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the purview of UPL, and the plaintiff's claim must fail.
However, if the trier of fact does answer these questions af-
firmatively, the product has risen to the level of ultrahazardous.
The trier has effectively found that it creates such a serious risk of
danger through its intentionally designed use that liability for any
loss caused by the product may be justifiably imposed on the
manufacturer.
i. element one applied to 101 California Street: the TEC-DC9
is ultrahazardous
The product in 101 California Street certainly satisfies the first
prong. The resulting harm from the designed use was great, and
there was a high degree of risk of harm to person. The TEC-DC9,
as modified and properly used, inflicted deadly injury when the
consumer walked into the conference room and killed seven peo-
ple and injured six others. It was also produced and modified with
the intent to inflict such deadly injury. The pistol had an ammuni-
tion magazine capable of delivering thirty-two bullets without re-
loading, a Hell-Fire trigger system that allowed all thirty-two bul-
lets to be emptied at a fully automatic rate, a shield to protect the
gunman's hands from the extreme heat generated by rapidly dis-
charging thirty-two bullets without pausing to reload, and a shoul-
der strap that allowed the weapon to swivel from the hip in order
to spray fire at a series of targets. Finally, manufacturers of the
TEC-DC9 and its product enhancements marketed their goods to
the general consumer public. As it is only a slight modification of
the TEC-9, an assault weapon designed for the South African mili-
tary, the TEC-DC9 was and is inappropriate for civilian use.
There is really no other purpose for a military assault weapon with
the firepower and capabilities of the TEC-DC9 than to seriously
injure or kill people. Consequently, the TEC-DC9 is ultrahazard-
ous within the meaning of UPL.
b. element two: abnormal alteration
The second element of UPL requires that the ultrahazardous
product or modification was not abnormally altered beyond what
the product or modification manufacturer could have reasonably
foreseen. If the product was modified such that it was not used in
a contemplated fashion, element two is not met. This inquiry is
designed to protect manufacturers who did not design products or
product modifications that were ultrahazardous but that nonethe-
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less have had their products or modifications brought within the
purview of UPL because of the unforeseeable actions of another
party. The doctrine of abnormal alteration protects manufacturers
from liability and serves as an affirmative defense to a claim under
UPL. If manufacturers do not intend their products to be ultra-
hazardous or to be modified into an ultrahazardous product by a
third party, they should be shielded from liability under UPL.
Consequently, UPL treats abnormal alteration much like the de-
fense of unforeseeable misuse under existing theories of productliability.96
While abnormal alteration is framed as its own element that
must be proven in the plaintiff's case, it is actually a facet of the
analysis under element one where the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's product or modified product is ultrahazardous. Ab-
normal alteration is naturally the inverse of showing that a modi-
fied product was designed to be ultrahazardous. If a defendant can
show that it originally created a "benign" product which was not
ultrahazardous until it was unforeseeably altered by a third party,
it has shown that it did not intend to design an ultrahazardous
good. Accordingly, under this element the plaintiff must establish
that there is either lack of abnormal alteration or that the altera-
tion at issue is not abnormal because it was foreseeable to the
manufacturer or possibly even intended. In contrast, defendants'
arguments will employ varying forms of the same logic: Some
third party unforeseeably altered the product such that the manu-
facturer's original design was transformed into an ultrahazardous
product, defeating the manufacturer's intended design and creat-
ing an ultrahazardous alteration.
The purpose of utilizing a distinct element for the doctrine of
abnormal alteration is twofold. First, separation facilitates an un-
derstanding of abnormal alteration's independent meaning as well
as its relationship to the first element. Second, its separate treat-
ment helps define the proper analytical framework which should
be employed by the parties and the respective burdens each party
165. Under strict products liability the seller may assume that the product will be put to
its intended use and is free from liability-either on negligence or strict liability theories-
for unintended, unexpected, and abnormal use. Expressed in terms of causation, the alleged
defect-in this case the ultrahazardous product-is not the proximate cause of the injury
when the plaintiff has abnormally altered or otherwise misused the product. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965) (stating that liability may exist
where the product "is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold").
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bears in establishing an ultrahazardous product and abnormal al-
teration, or lack thereof.
To determine abnormal alteration within the meaning of
UPL, the trier of fact must examine whether the original product,
the product modification, or the modified product was altered in a
way that the product manufacturer or modification manufacturer
could not have reasonably anticipated. In making this determina-
tion the trier of fact may consider the knowledge of the defendant
manufacturer or the knowledge of defendant manufacturer's in-
dustry at large. As the average trier of fact may not be aware of
the present state of the product industry's knowledge, such as what
alterations and uses are foreseeable, this evidence will aid the trier
of fact's decision.
The trier of fact could encounter three distinct types of ab-
normal alteration: (1) the underlying product itself was abnor-
mally altered; (2) a modified product-a product that was modi-
fied with an aftermarket add-on-was abnormally altered; or (3)
an after market add-on itself was abnormally altered and used with
another product, making the modified product, as a whole, abnor-
mally altered. In examining the first situation, the trier of fact
looks to whether the alteration was reasonably foreseeable by the
product manufacturer. If so, that manufacturer cannot use ab-
normal alteration as a defense. In the second and third situations,
the trier of fact looks to the reasonable knowledge of both the
product manufacturer and the add-on manufacturer. If either
could have reasonably foreseen the alteration, such alteration was
not abnormal, and the party that should have foreseen the change
may not use the defense.166
The purpose of a reasonable foreseeability standard is to
avoid collusion between manufacturers and their consumers or the
entities in the chain of sale and distribution. If the reasonable
foreseeability standard were not used, manufacturers could evade
UPL by designing a product that was not ultrahazardous when de-
livered but that was designed to be modified by a third party into
an ultrahazardous product. This scenario resembles the example
above where several manufacturers produce and market the dif-
ferent component parts of an assault weapon with the intent that
166. Note that even if abnormal alteration is established, it does not stand as a complete
defense. Rather, as discussed below, the jury will use abnormal alteration in its causation
analysis to determine if such alteration caused the harm or the product itself, despite the al-
teration, caused the harm.
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the consumer will assemble them into a single product. As pro-
duced, the component parts are not ultrahazardous, but when as-
sembled or altered they become an ultrahazardous product. It is
this situation that the reasonable foreseeability test seeks to pre-
vent.
i. element two applied to 101 California Street there was no
abnormal alteration
In 101 California Street, there was no abnormal alteration of
the original product, the product add-ons, or the modified product
as a whole. The Hell-Fire trigger system was a simple spring
mechanism designed to allow the TEC-DC9 to fire in a fully auto-
matic fashion, and the USA magazine added a larger bullet reserve
designed to fit the TEC-DC9. These modifications, designed for
the TEC-DC9, were not unreasonably foreseeable; rather, they
were specifically foreseen and intended by the add-on manufac-
turers.
c. element three: causation
The third element of UPL that the plaintiff must establish is
the requisite causation-as with any claim in tort. For this ele-
ment, the plaintiff must show that the ultrahazardous product was
a substantial factor in causing the claimed damages. Similarly, the
plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite proximate cause.
The test for causation is framed in terms of the ultrahazardous
product. This means that the plaintiff will not reach this element if
the product has not been found ultrahazardous. However, if the
product has been found ultrahazardous, causation must still be es-
tablished. Causation can be examined under two factual scenarios:
(1) an ultrahazardous product that is not abnormally altered and
(2) an ultrahazardous product that is abnormally altered. If the
product is found ultrahazardous but not abnormally altered, it
must be determined whether that product caused the harm at is-
sue. If the product is found ultrahazardous and abnormally al-
tered, it must be determined whether the product caused the harm
despite the abnormal alteration or as a result of the abnormal al-
teration. If the harm was caused as a result of an abnormal altera-
tion, there is no causation on the part of the manufacturer 67 and
no liability under UPL. If, on the other hand, the harm would
167. This assumes the manufacturer did not make the abnormal alteration.
1595
1596 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
have occurred despite the abnormal alteration, the causal link ex-
ists. Of course, the jury may apportion causation between the ab-
normal alteration and the underlying product according to the evi-
dence just as it would under existing tort law.
In the situation of well-made gun cases, proximate cause will
no longer present the same thorny issue it did under traditional
tort theories. In those traditional cases there was no proximate
cause when a third party's intentional use of a firearm to shoot an-
other was not foreseeable. However, a gun manufacturer within
the purview of UPL cannot make such an argument. Because its
well-made firearm is an ultrahazardous product, the trier of fact
will have determined that the product was designed to inflict seri-
ous or deadly injury when properly used. This certainly precludes
a finding that it was not foreseeable that the gun would be used to
shoot another person. Consequently, proximate cause must, by
definition, be decided in favor of a well-made gun plaintiff.
i. element three applied to 101 California Street.: there is requisite
causation
In 101 California Street it is clear that the two TEC-DC9's
used in the shooting were substantial factors in bringing about the
deaths of the seven innocent victims. Ferri's semiautomatic TEC-
DC9s allowed him to unload sixty-four rounds of ammunition in
the Petit & Martin conference room without reloading. He did not
have to be accurate in his targeting because the swing swivel and
shoulder strap allowed him to spray fire from both weapons from
his hip, covering every area of the room. In addition, the barrel
shroud protected Ferri's hands from the extreme heat the weapons
created so that he could continue to hold the products and fire
their ammunition. Furthermore, the manufacturers of this weapon
and its aftermarket enhancements certainly contemplated its use
on other human beings. The TEC-DC9 was derived from a
weapon produced specifically for the South African military where
its intended use was in the battlefield. Consequently, the TEC-
DC9s satisfy the requirements of cause in fact and proximate cause
under UPL.
d. element four: general consumer marketing
Once the plaintiff establishes each of the first three elements,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the ultrahazardous
product was not marketed, sold, distributed, or otherwise ulti-
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mately delivered to the general consumer public through ordinary
consumer channels or that it was not reasonably foreseeable that
the product would be ultimately delivered to the general consumerpublic. 6
If a member of the general consumer public has access to the
product, a rebuttable presumption arises that the product was
made available to the general consumer public at large. The de-
fendant then bears the burden to rebut this presumption. If the
defendant successfully rebuts this presumption, the plaintiff has
failed to make a case under UPL. Such presumption is founded on
the following premise: If a single member of the consumer public
has access to the product at issue, so must the entire consumer
public; if the entire consumer public has access to the product, it
must have been marketed to general consumers.
The purpose of this fourth element is to remove parties from
the purview of UPL who manufacture and sell ultrahazardous
products to very specialized markets not intended for general con-
sumer use. For example, a product that meets the requirements of
prongs one through three but fails under prong four would be any
type of ultrahazardous product sold exclusively to the United
States military. In this situation the manufacturer did not seek to
market an ultrahazardous product to general consumers. Instead,
it placed the product into the hands of an entity trained to use it
for military purposes. Removing the product from the general
public's consumption eliminates the risk of harm targeted by UPL,
and the doctrine should impose no liability.
Finally, even if the defendant cannot rebut the presumption of
general consumer marketing, a defendant manufacturer will not be
held liable under UPL if it can show that the product was used un-
der legal privilege. 69 For example, UPL would not hold
168. Cf Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 234 (1978) (holding that the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
product is not defective once plaintiff shows design of product was the cause of injury).
169. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 16.
"Privilege" is the modem term applied to those considerations which avoid liabil-
ity where it might otherwise follow. As used in this text, it is applied to any cir-
cumstance justifying or excusing a prima facie tort, such as a battery, assault, or
trespass; it signifies that the defendant has acted to further an interest of such so-
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defendants liable for the use of an ultrahazardous product in self-
defense'70 or in the rendition of law enforcement services. So long
as the force used was appropriate based on the victim's reasonable
apprehension of fear in the given situation, such force is permitted
by law. As there would be no civil liability for battery or assault
there should be no liability under UPL either. Since privileges are
based on the idea that a person must be allowed a certain freedom
in action "because his own interests, or those of the public, require
it, and because social policy will be best served by permitting it,
171
they should extend to an attempted recovery under UPL. Other-
wise, UPL would circumvent the law of privileges and thwart its
underlying policy.
4. Scope of liability under UPL
If the plaintiff establishes the case in chief as defined above,
the manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, and retailer of any ul-
trahazardous product, as well as any other party in the chain of
production, distribution, and sale, can be held liable under UPL.'72
When dealing with modified products, the scope of liability
becomes slightly more complicated. If a modified product is found
ultrahazardous, the manufacturers of both the modification and
the unmodified product are jointly and severally liable. If the
original product is not found ultrahazardous but the modified
product is, the modification manufacturer is liable while the origi-
nal manufacturer is not, unless the modification was reasonably
foreseeable by the original manufacturer. If the modification was
reasonably foreseeable, all parties in the chain of distribution and
sale are jointly and severally liable to the extent that each party
knew or should have known the modification was reasonably fore-
seeable.
When dealing with an abnormally altered product, the rules
are the same as with modified products. If the product is altered in
170. See id. § 19. The privilege of self defense
is now undisputed [] in the law of torts as well as in the criminal law. The privi-
lege extends to the use of all reasonable force to prevent any threatened harmful
or offensive bodily contact, or any confinement whether intended or negligent.
Since it originated as a defense, the burden is upon the defendant to establish the
facts creating the privilege.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. § 16.
172. These entities will be collectively referred to as "manufacturer."
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a nonabnormal fashion, it is treated as a modified product and ex-
amined accordingly. If the product is abnormally altered, but the
trier of fact determines that some or all of the harm complained of
would have occurred despite the alteration, it is treated as a modi-
fied product and examined accordingly. However, if the product is
abnormally altered and such alteration is the sole cause of the
harm complained of, the manufacturer of the original product is
not liable under UPL.
III. CONCLUSION
The end result of UPL is that those injured by certain well-
made guns, either in their person or property, can recover from the
various entities in the manufacturing and marketing enterprise.
These entities can no longer sell and distribute their ultrahazard-
ous products to the general public with impunity. They will be
forced to bear responsibility for the harms caused by their prod-
ucts, just as all other manufacturers are.
Of course, as the new theory of recovery is set forth above, the
trier of fact will ultimately determine which firearms are ultrahaz-
ardous. While it is clear that the assault weapons used in the Petit
& Martin shooting certainly qualify, the issue is less clear when
dealing with other guns, such as low volume handguns and low
powered hunting rifles. It is not possible to define every situation
that can arise under firearm violence. However, it is possible to
carve out a general cause of action that, in theory, applies to those
firearms and products that pose such a threat to the health and
safety of our society that their social value, if any, is greatly out-
weighed. That theory is Ultrahazardous Products Liability, and its
application is awaited.
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